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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation thesis examines the determinants of audit fees charged on US banks and 
especially the impact of probability of default of banks on them, by creating a balanced panel 
set of data, comprising by 122 US banks for a period of thirteen years (2003-2015). In addition, 
the set is divided into two sub-periods, the pre-crisis period (2003 – 2007) and the post-crisis 
period (2008 – 2015). The objective of this study is firstly to check if insolvency status of a 
bank can affect the audit pricing and secondly to examine the world’s financial crisis effect on 
banks’ audit pricing, by using agency theory and information asymmetry theory as theoretical 
framework. More specifically, in this analysis, are employed bank-specific variables, such as 
the probability of default of banks that has not been examined by previous studies, along with 
the most commonly used auditee and auditor specific characteristics. Results show that the 
variables being under examination, have the expected effect on audit pricing, besides some 
exceptions and differentiations between the two sub-periods due to the financial crisis effect. 
A negative correlation between the relationship of banks’ profitability and audit engagement 
characteristic risk with the audit fees is indicated. All the rest variables indicate a positive 
correlation between them and the fees charged. Furthermore, differences on what the 
auditors considered more significant for pricing the auditing act before and after the crisis are 
observed. Regarding the insolvency status of bank seems to differentiate before and after the 
crisis and during the period of 2003 to 2015 there is a statistically significant effect, although 
it can be considered as weak. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Wallace (1980), the audit act is valuable for three reasons. Firstly, due to its 
function, which is the monitoring mechanism. Secondly, to act as an insurance against 
misstatements and finally to fulfil the increased demand for information that investors need 
in their decision-making process. The increase in the demand for auditing as a control 
mechanism has been even further intensified during the end of 20th century. That is due to 
the economic crisis and scandals that continue to take place until these days. That triggered 
the need for stricter control and regulation of companies. Observing the scandals that took 
place the last years, it is obvious that the urgent need of the financial institutions, companies 
and investors for reliable and precise financial or non-financial information, is continuously 
increasing. The lack of reliability led to the formation of the act of auditing as we know it 
today. In general, the act of auditing ensures better information quality provided and more 
particularly, the financial information investors receive will lead to the mitigation of 
information asymmetries. Mitigation of information asymmetries will result to an easier 
capital inflow with lower cost of capital. In addition, the act of auditing will help companies 
or the financial institutions to encounter with the agency costs that can be considered 
responsible for a corporate or bank failure.  
Concerning just the financial system, given its peculiarities, the credibility of accounting 
information is important. That is because an institution’s accounting health status can launch 
a chain reaction, involving mainly other banks or even at a later stage, other economic 
segments. Following the latest 2008 financial crisis, it is vital to create an environment of 
trust. The role that the external auditors are appointed is the role of the supervisory and 
regulatory bodies that are responsible for the soundness of the financial system and also to 
maintain the financial stability, by validating the financial or accounting information provided. 
As Goulart (2007) states “transparency is one of the foundations of a sound financial system”. 
As a result, central banks and international agencies demand from financial institutions to 
provide not only transparent information demonstrating their financial position, but 
information concerning their organizational structure, risk management and internal controls 
too.  
Fees charged for auditing can be considered as a reflection of the audit quality. Thus, it is 
logical that audit pricing and especially the facts that may affect the audit fees has drawn the 
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interest of the US literature. Simunic (1980) is the first who analyzed audit fees by using 
empirical methods. The author thought that the use of external audit can reduce the liability 
from the auditee to the users of information and the fees paid can be considered as the 
special cost that entity being audited, is willing to pay for the service provided. More 
specifically, as Simunic (1980) states, “the audit fees depend on the amount of auditor's work 
and the unit price” and “different audit fees of different companies are due to different 
workload of audit work and different unit prices”. These characteristics must be determined 
by the competition of the particular market. In addition, the audit fees must also cover the 
auditor's cost, the risk taken and the required profit. In many studies and especially in Simunic 
(1980) it is stated that the auditor's compensation consists of three parts: the expected loss 
costs (including litigation losses), the normal profits of accounting entities and finally, the 
inherent cost of the audit. The auditors aim to obtain the highest possible profits from the 
audit act and the auditees aim to minimize the cost of financial reporting system. As a result, 
with the act of audit pricing, both sides are maximizing their interests. Since then, the model 
has been used as the basis in many studies with the only variation being in the variables being 
tested (Hay et al. 2006). Furthermore, the globalization of the word economy created the 
need for extension of the literature in more countries and especially in the Europe area, which 
is characterized from its idiosyncrasies.  
The financial position of an entity, whether it is under financial distress or not, is a very 
important based on the aforementioned paragraphs. Especially concerning the financial 
system and its peculiarities. The unique features of the banking industry likely require 
auditors to make substantial investments in industry-specific knowledge. Those audit firms 
that make the greatest investments potentially can gain reputations as bank industry 
specialists and industry specialization enables auditors to command premium audit fees. 
According to Grossman and Hart (1982), banks that are insolvent or under financial distress, 
will prefer to engage with a high-quality auditor in order to maintain any advantage they 
possess in the market. That way will eliminate any unfavorable effect on investors’ decision. 
In addition, according to Francis and Wilson (1988), insolvent banks will hire a Big-4 auditor, 
not only to increase investors’ confidence but to eliminate the litigation risk too. Since Big-4 
are considered as high-quality auditors and maintain a large clientele, there is no incentive to 
distort any conclusions and produce any quality of the results issues. Distorting the 
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disclosures will lead to a decrease in their reputation, which is strongly related with the 
increased fees charged for the services they provide. As a result, it can be seen that according 
to the literature a first connection is established about the relationship between these two 
measures and in fact is positive. 
This analysis tries to shed more light into the relationship between the financial position of 
the financial institution or otherwise the probability of going bankrupt and the fees charged 
for auditing. Prior literature has not investigated deeply the relationship, as it has been done 
for other industries. As a result, this thesis structures a discussion around the dimension of 
audit pricing in US banking industry and in what extend the sector changed after the recent 
crisis. 
In this thesis, various hypotheses concerning the determinants of audit pricing are being 
tested.  Using quantitative methods and especially regression analysis, interesting findings 
are presented for the factors determining the audit fees and especially regarding the effect 
of probability of default of banks on audit fees. Based on previous researches, the variables 
that are included in the regression model was the client and auditor characteristics and the 
engagement risk proxies too. More particularly, the size, the complexity, the risk of the 
auditee, the auditor size and the engagement characteristic risks along with the probability 
of default of banks that it is used as a control variable. The analysis deals with data from 122 
US banking institutions. 
According to the predicted outcome, the auditee and auditor characteristics as the audit 
engagement characteristics should have a positive connection with audit fees charged by 
auditors. However, the results of this thesis diverge from the supposed correlation between 
the aforementioned variables. The profitability of the bank and the inherent risk proxies used 
in the model of this dissertation produce an opposite outcome and seems that have a 
negative effect on fees charged by auditors. The rest of the variables used as proxies for the 
three aforementioned categories seems to experience a significant and positive correlation 
with the audit fees. In addition, it is crucial to focus on the variable that is the most interesting 
for this thesis, the insolvency status of the banks. The results of the panel analysis indicated 
a statistically significant positive relationship between the probability of default of banks and 
the audit fees. Despite the fact that the impact of the first on the latter is weak it is evidence 
that auditors consider the insolvency status of a bank a crucial characteristic in a way that 
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they demand for increased payments for auditing. Furthermore, another interesting feature 
is the alteration of audit fees determinants’ behavior, after the financial crisis of 2008. Finally, 
an attempt of checking for reverse causality between the insolvency status of the banks and 
the audit fees is performed. The outcome shows that in some cases, not only the probability 
of default causes the audit fees, but the opposite happens too.  
Further possible explanations of the aforementioned results are being analyzed in the next 
parts of the thesis. The following part is consisted of the theoretical framework that analyzes 
the basic theories of the audit fees and its determinants. Agency theory and information 
asymmetry is the basis of the theoretical framework used in this thesis. Continuing, the 
hypothesis being tested is developed, based on a general literature review, which represent 
various views from other authors. Moreover, information regarding the data collection and 
methodology for the analysis followed, are provided analytically. The final part consists of the 
empirical analysis with the corresponding results and the related conclusions of the 
dissertation. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Despite the fact that it is not obligatory by the legislation in all nations, many entities are 
subjected to auditing by an external entity. That is due to the main problem of principal-agent 
repercussions that is possible to cause internal conflicts, due to the fact that incentives and 
interests of each party is not perfectly aligned with each other. 
The structure of a financial institution is characterized, by Jensen and Meckling (1976), as a 
‘nexus of contracts’ between individuals with different characteristics. In a financial 
institution, the individuals besides the different characteristics have also their own interests 
and goals, which are supposed to be fulfilled by making the most beneficial for them 
relationship. In addition, the divergence between ownership and management is attributed 
to the managers, who they do not retain a full residual claim. As a result, managers will not 
take the full return on their efforts when they act in institutions’ benefit that is to increase 
the profits, while in the same time they deal with the negative perspective of the cost of 
effort. So, managers have an incentive to adjust their efforts so as to match their personal 
goals that will offer them the full benefits.  
The main goal of an entity, in order to have a sustainable development, is to attract investors 
who can provide it with the needed capital inflows.  Accurate, reliable and timely information 
are the characteristics required from the investors in order to trust a firm and invest their 
money in. Consequently, the financial statements that are monitored and audited from an 
external auditor are considered as more reliable and more trustworthy. Since the audited 
financial statements offer security that are free of error, most investors demand to be 
provided to them before the process of decision-making. 
2.1. Agency Theory 
The agency relationship has been defined as ‘the contract under which one or more 
individuals (principals) engage another individual (agent) to perform a service on their behalf 
involving transferring part of decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). In general, all relationships that are tied with a contract can be considered that contain 
elements of an agency relationship (Ross, 1973). Besides the universal cases of agency 
relationship, a common example is the shareholder-management relationship in an entity. 
The management is supposed to act in the benefit of the shareholders.  
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More particularly, in order to maximize their utility, both parties are expected to act in a 
rational way. However, the utilities are not perfectly aligned and that makes the relationship 
a problematic one (Ross 1973). According to agency relationship, the expectation is that the 
agents will act in principals’ best interest, while the principal will consent in that actions 
(Mitnick, 1973). However, it is probable that the benefit of the agent is not the same with the 
benefit of the principal, a fact that leads to conflict of interests.  According to Mitnick (1973), 
that is the principal’s problem and it can be eliminated with the motivation of the agent in 
order to act in principal’s best interest in a way that the latter prefers.  
The answer to this problem comes with the act of monitoring the agent, an act that might 
raise troubles. Besides the obvious problems, the act of monitoring might be in some cases 
not economically feasible and that in turn could be an indication of existence of asymmetry 
in information between the two parties (Ross, 1973). Nyberg et al. (2010), in their study state 
that the increased need for monitoring and incentive packages derives from the existence of 
asymmetry in the information shared and the differences in the interest of the two parties. 
Hence, agency costs are created, such as the cost of managing the agents’ behavior. Thus, in 
entities that the agency costs are arisen, the audit fees charged would be greater.  
As it was already mentioned, the solution to the problem is to employ a monitor mechanism. 
Thus, the stewardship demand rises. According to Gjesdal (1981), the act of employing 
managers that will be responsible for the decision making process in the entity, creates 
increases the need for information to be provided concerning the actions taken. That need is 
defined as the stewardship demand. The difference between agency theory and stewardship 
theory is that in the first both parties are utility maximizers, while in the latter, the agent has 
a moral obligation against the principal (Hernandez, 2012). Meaning that the agent will act in 
the best interest of the organization (Fox and Hamilton, 1994). As a result, the interest of both 
parties will align in a higher degree, aiming in maximizing the organization’s benefit. In cases 
that the stewardship theory stands, the managers will publish information about the use of 
resources to accountable individuals, without the need for monitoring (Gjesdal, 1981). Thus, 
the agency costs will be significantly reduced. In terms of auditing, the fees charged would be 
lower in entities that the stewardship theory holds. 
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2.2. Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry theory is based on the existence of asymmetry in information 
between agents and principals, which creates the need for auditing. The fact that information 
is not totally available to the principals, during the decision making process, makes it 
impossible for them to determine if the actions of the agents are in the best interest of the 
entity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). More specifically, managers need to have access to reliable 
financial information in decision-making process, in order to make an efficient allocation of 
resources in capital market. The aim of auditing in that case is to ensure the soundness of 
financial information provided. Stakeholders, investors and creditors they do not always 
manage to obtain sufficient information and they must rely just on the financial information 
provided to them. Thus, this situation creates a high quality information demand. Therefore, 
a cost that must be paid by them rises and if the benefit obtained from that information is 
higher than the cost of it, then the act of auditing is implemented. According to information 
asymmetry theory, information contains value and is a good with public nature. As a result, 
the quality of the financial information must be decided by external auditors (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The higher the information asymmetry, the higher the demand for high 
quality information that leads to higher cost the managers must pay and in turn the higher 
the audit fees charged. 
2.3. Monitoring Mechanism & Costs 
In cases that agency theory holds, both parties of the contract are utility maximizers and act 
in their best interest, which differs for each individual. Thus, in order the principal to ensure 
that the agent will act in principal’s benefit, is deploying a monitoring mechanism that creates 
the agency cost. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency cost consist of three 
elements, the monitoring expenditures, the bonding expenditures and the residual loss. The 
monitoring expenditures are from the part of the principal and from the agent part are the 
bonding expenditures. The residual loss concerns both parts of the contract. 
According to Mitnick (1973), in case of auditing, the agency cost that rises as part of the 
monitoring mechanism, is the audit fees charged. These fees have two basic determinants, 
the audit pricing per unit and the amount of time spent on the act of audit (Simunic, 1980). 
On the other hand, when there are numerous agents the most viable option is considered to 
be monitoring. However, in a case like that it might not be economically feasible to monitor 
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numerous agents (Ross, 1973). In these cases, the agents’ actions are being managed by the 
bonding cost that prohibits them to take certain actions or by the compensation that the 
principal receives when eventually are undertaken (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
When the principal’s and agent’s interests significantly diverge the agency cost is at its highest 
(Fleming et al., 2005) and respectively, when the interests of both parties are aligned, the 
agency costs are at its lowest with only the residual costs to be applied (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In the financial sector, only in a 100% owner-managed entity the agency cost would 
be at its lowest due to the perfect interest alignment (Fleming et al., 2005). 
2.4. Demand for Auditing in Banking Industry 
Referring to audit services, the American Accounting Associations Committee on Basic 
Auditing Concepts (1973) as cited by Ittonen (2010), stated specific criteria that create the 
demand for auditing like consequences of errors, the potential conflict of interest and 
complexity. 
The conflict of interest that it is created between the two parties, the preparer (bank 
management) of the information and the user (shareholders, creditors, government, bank 
customers) can induce the demand in auditing services. The circumstance is able to create a 
biased information, since the basic characteristics of the report (extent, timing and method) 
can be chosen by the manager. As a result, auditors are obliged to control the information 
quality and perform an independent review, the audit. 
Ittonen (2010) emphasizes that corporate reporting, deliberate and unintentional are able to 
define the two sources of conflict. Firstly, managers may prepare and reveal information that 
is biased, deliberately for their own benefit (selfish interest). In addition, unintentional bias 
existence, in financial information, can be appointed to the bank management when it tries 
to indulge the interests of one group at the expense of the other. An example of the latter 
can be the case when a bank manager pleases the lenders’ interests, in order to get better 
loan terms and to finally be able to meet their debt obligations. On the other hand, 
management may attempt to fulfill owner’s needs, at the expense of other owners. At these 
point of view, this is why auditing exists and its main goal is to obtain unbiased and reliable 
reporting and to prevent the one group’s interest to benefit at the expense of the other. 
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Furthermore, as Ittonen (2010) cites “the demand for auditing may also be attributed to the 
significant economic, social or other consequences of users’ erroneous decisions”. To 
improve their decision making quality, investors need information that are complete and 
reliable. Thus, auditors, adding the credibility in the fundamental intelligence, help users to 
make more precise evaluations. 
In addition, accounting in general and preparation of financial statements and reporting in 
general, are becoming even more complex. Knowledge of institutional settings, governance 
issues, accounting and reporting practices, banks’ laws and regulations are basic 
requirements in order to construct and most importantly understand and interpret a financial 
statement. This explains why users find it difficult to evaluate the financial statements’ quality 
and integrity. The difficulties of the reporting process may also be an obstacle for the preparer 
because of lack of knowledge. Thus, the auditors are appointed to provide users an estimation 
of the information quality.  
Finally, banks’ users, who are interested in the financial reports, do not have a direct access 
to them and to the records that the financial statements have been based on. Moreover, in 
the case that these records would ever be provided to them, the high cost and the strict time 
due to the complex structure of the banks, prevents the users from having an in depth 
research. Remoteness, is an obstacle that stop users from directly auditing the financial 
statements and reports. As a result, users must rely on audit firms to help them in evaluating 
the information quality. 
2.5. Audit Fees Determinants 
The literature on audit pricing can be characterized as abundant. Simunic (1980, was the 
among firsts researchers to produce not only theoretical but empirical evidence too, 
concerning the determinants of this contracting cost. According to the author, audit fees 
could increase due to the time spent or due to the audit price per unit. Furthermore, as 
suggested by Hay et al. (2006), determinants of audit fees, assuming a competitive audit 
market, can be broadly classified into the following three categories: auditor attributes, client 
(auditee) attributes and audit engagement specific characteristics. The most popular category 
in the literature seems to be the client specific characteristics, which often include metrics of 
risk, size and complexity. More particularly, in consistency with Simunic’s (1980) theory on 
audit effort and litigation risk, the fees charged for auditing have been documented to be 
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increasing in all three aforementioned client characteristics, client risk (Stice, 1991), size 
(Simunic, 1980) and complexity (Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997). 
Audit fee determinants analysis applied in this thesis, are categorized into these three 
aforementioned groups, the auditor attributes, the client attributes and the specific 
engagement risk characteristics. The sub-categories of each main aforementioned category 
is being analyzed in the following sections of the study (2.5.1 – 2.5.3). 
2.5.1. Client Specific 
Client specific characteristics is the category that it is being under research the most times in 
literature. Those characteristics can be included in the main category of the increased audit 
effort category as in the increased risk category too, depending on the characteristics being 
under analysis. In general, the auditee characteristics (size, complexity, risk) intensify the 
need for monitoring and as a result the need for auditing. More particularly, during the 
decision-making process, the interests of the two parties may not be aligned (Ross, 1973) and 
due to the complex business decisions that are undertaken that may damage the principals’ 
interests, the need for monitoring is increasing. The monitor mechanism in that case is 
auditing. 
Bank Size 
The large size of an entity makes the auditors to consume more time on the analysis in order 
to fulfill the auditing. More particularly, in order to test the entity in a holistic setting and in 
detail, to maintain the auditor-client relationship and to understand the client’s specific 
characteristics, requires more time spent as the size of the entity increases. That indicates 
that large-sized entities will be priced for more services. Thus, the fees charged for auditing 
would be higher, compared to a small-sized entity (Palmrose, 1986). 
Bank Complexity  
Complexity of the auditee can be in many forms, for example whether it is spread extensively 
geographically, which would have made the auditing practice more difficult. As the number 
of subsidiaries increases, complexity increases. That in turn will increase the time that the 
auditor needs for the act of auditing (Menon and Williams, 2001). Furthermore, according to 
Taylor and Simon (1999), the more the complexity of auditee financial statements, the more 
the litigation risk that exists, due to the material misstatements. Thus, in accordance with 
Simunic (1980), auditors must devote more time in examining the financial statements and 
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its peculiarities, in order to ensure the quality of information provided from them is sufficient. 
Therefore, as the required time increases, the audit fees increase too. 
Bank Risk 
As it was mentioned before, difficult audits increase the demand for expertise in the audit act 
(Simunic, 1980). The expertise that it is needed in order to perform the auditing is likely to 
increase time spent on the procedure and the price per unit as well (Zerni, 2012). The need 
for expertise during the procedure can be appointed to the inherent risk, which according to 
Maletta (1993), can be defined as the risk of making a misstatement in the financial 
statements, due to account specific error risk. During the procedure on an entity with low 
inherent risk, the auditor can rely on the entity’s internal control mechanisms, while in cases 
with high inherent risk they cannot. That leads the auditors to use more complex mechanisms 
for auditing and more time spent on the procedure (Maletta, 1993). Thus, high inherent risk 
settings, besides the increase in the probability of misstatement and as a result the risk of 
future litigation will also increase the time spent on auditing and that can be reflected as 
increased audit fees.  
2.5.2. Auditor Specific 
Auditor Size 
The auditor size is being measured by the literature using the “Big-N” variable as a proxy. That 
is because large audit firms may have an incentive to provide a high quality audit (DeAngelo, 
1981). In the literature this specific variable has been used numerous times as a dependent 
variable in order to analyze the determinants of clients’ demand for better audit quality 
(Wang et al., 2008). On the other hand, a large proportion of the literature has been using 
this measure as independent variable to determine how Big-N firms may affect the audit 
pricing. In the case of the financial sector, a large-sized bank is more common to appoint the 
audit practice to a Big-N auditor (Simunic, 1980). In that notion, while the Big-N auditors 
provide high quality of services, it is normal to receive an audit fee premium (Ebrahim, 2010; 
Choi et al., 2008) and as a result, the audit fees will be higher due to the premium. Most 
recent studies produced result of the existence of the audit fee premium for Big-N firms (Choi 
et al., 2008), which can be linked to increased audit fees charged. 
Auditor Change 
Auditor change in also an important factor affecting audit fee. Various studies indicated that 
auditors that need to keep their clientele or to attract new clients, they succeed by charging 
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low audit fees on new engagements (DeAngelo, 1981). According to that theory, the newly 
appointed audit firm will charge lower fees for the procedure. However, there is a large 
proportion of the literature that despite the aforementioned theory, produces results for the 
opposite. Especially Big-N audit firms, when they are newly appointed they charge high audit 
fees, either due to the fee premium or due to the audit engagement risk that is it going to be 
analyzed next (DeAngelo, 1981). 
2.5.3. Engagement Characteristic Risks 
The audit engagement characteristic risk can be described as the exposure that the auditor 
suffers from possible adverse publicity, from litigation injuries and from other events that are 
linked to errors in the financial statements that are being audited (SAS 106). As Knechel et al. 
(2007) stated, the engagement characteristic risk can be risen through three possible sources: 
regulation, reputation and litigation risks. Regulation risk is in the form of enforcements and 
fines imposed on the entity. Reputation risk is linked with the impairment of the entity’s 
publicity and finally, litigation risk appears again in the form of fines and financial penalties. 
Furthermore, these three risks are linked to each other. As it is mentioned by DeFond and 
Zhang (2014), the existence of litigation and regulatory risk may be able to decrease also the 
reputation of the audit firm. In this particular thesis only the litigation risk it is used as an 
audit fee determinant for the US banking system. 
Litigation Risk 
As it was mentioned before, the existence of litigation risk can be disastrous for the auditor, 
threatening even a viable position that has been obtained through many years of the firm 
existence. Thus, auditors act following different strategies in order to be immunized and 
minimize the threat of litigation risk. The literature suggested two possible strategies that are 
connected to the fees charged for auditing. The first one is the increased effort on audit so as 
to increase audit quality and in turn to minimize the litigation risk (Simunic, 1980). The second 
one is the acceptance of the increased litigation risk by the auditor, by charging the 
aforementioned audit fee premium (Bell et al., 2008).  
According to DeFond and Zhang (2014), both strategies must be accepted by the client in 
order to be implemented. Meaning that the client is willing to be charged extra fees. 
Furthermore, the use of additional effort to minimize the risk does not suggest the 
elimination of the risk. That is due to the fact that audit firms can receive a fine or be sued 
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even when they comply with regulations (SAS 47). As a result, auditors may charge the fee 
premium in any case, in order to be safe against a residual risk. Meaning that in all cases of 
litigation risk existence, the audit fees will be higher compared to if there was not existed 
(Simunic and Stein, 1996). 
2.5.4. Financial Distress of the Bank (Insolvency) 
The fact that the financial condition of the bank, whether if it is probable to default or not, is 
quoted as a separate category in this thesis, because it can affect both the audit effort and 
audit price per unit. More specifically, it can both be considered as a client characteristic and 
as an audit engagement characteristic risk.  
Numerous cases of bankruptcies have been observed during the outburst of the financial 
crisis in 2008. The economic environment has been characterized as uncertain and highly 
volatile, facts that may have an effect on the entity’s decision about the auditor selection. 
Meaning that in turn the audit pricing has been affected too. Previous literature and results 
seems to be uncertain on the relationship and the level of affection between the two 
aforementioned facts. However, the most prevalent theory concerning the relationship is of 
Grossman’s and Hart’s (1982), who found that entities being under financial distress or even 
close to bankruptcy, will tend to maintain or increase every favorable view that is displayed 
to the market. Thus, they will tend to engage with a Big-N audit firm, which will be able to 
minimize any impact of the entity’s performance on the public and investors, while it offers 
the entity a more effective monitoring mechanism.  
Since the Big-N audit firms are considered as of high quality auditors and based on previous 
analysis about the audit fee premium, the audit fees charged for auditing an entity being 
under financial distress are expected to be higher
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Based on prior researches on the field and specifically by applying the audit fee determinants 
model that has been initially proposed by Simunic (1980), this analysis tries to establish the 
connection among the financial position of a bank (probability of default) and audit fees.  
According to the agency theory, the diverging interests between the two parties involved, the 
principal and the agent, create a need for monitoring which as has been analyzed before, it is 
being determined by various factors. Thus, the diverging interests of the parties involved 
suggest the existence of an agency problem. Furthermore, the higher the divergence between 
the principal’s and agent’s interests, the more the monitoring cost will increase (Fleming et 
al., 2005). Meaning that as the interests’ divergence is higher, the more time spent by the 
auditor (monitor mechanism), in order to assure the principal that the agent acts in his best 
interest.  As a result, the increased time spent will be reflected in the increased audit fees. 
Since the fees charged for auditing are associated with the monitoring cost, then the 
worsening financial position of the entity, will increase the divergence of interests and thus, 
the audit fees charged will also increase. So, it can be seen that these monitoring factors may 
affect the two basic assumptions, concerning the determinants of audit fees that Simunic 
(1980) developed. Particularly, the probability of default, is going to affect the fees by 
increasing the time spent on the auditing or more importantly, by increasing the audit pricing 
per unit, due to the need for expertise and the increased risk undertaken. As a result, taking 
into account the aforementioned assumption, the monitoring factor of probability of default, 
should be correlated with the fees charged for auditing. Hence, the hypothesis posed it is 
based on agency theory and bank’s probability of going bankrupt: 
H1. Audit fees are positively associated with insolvency status of the bank.
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4. RESEARCH METHOD 
At this chapter, the overall research design is reported, along with all the characteristics of 
the analysis. More specifically, the sample selection and data collection procedure, the 
variables’ measures and the model specifications are reported and analyzed. 
4.1. Overall Research Design 
As it was mentioned in earlier section of this study, the motivation of this dissertation thesis 
is to find out how the probability of default of banks affects the audit pricing and how the 
recent financial crisis affected the determinants of audit pricing in general. Therefore, the 
first step is to make an estimate the model deploying the whole sample including the years 
from 2003 to 2015. The next step is the separation of the data in the pre-crisis period (2003-
2007) and post-crisis period (2008-2015), which will be used to recalculate the audit fees 
determinants, before and during the financial crisis using the same model.  
The calculations were conducted with the usage of EViews 7, STATA and MS Excel. Each of 
the aforementioned sub-samples and total sample, is controlled for time, so it is firstly 
assessed with only cross-sectional fixed effects regression. Following the aforementioned 
regression, the Redundant Fixed Effects Likelihood Ratio Test is conducted, which suggests if 
it is better to use a simple pooled estimation or a cross-sectional fixed effect model. In 
addition, the Hausman test is conducted, in order to be decided whether the random effects 
model is better for the analysis than the fixed effects model. Using the appropriate critical 
values, if the probability obtained from the test is higher than the critical values that follow 
the chi-squared distribution, the fixed effect is the appropriate model. Concerning this 
analysis and specifically for the main sample and both sub-samples, the fix effects model is 
appropriate according to the results of the Hausman test. That could be explained from the 
form of the sample data that it is explained in the next section. 
Furthermore, the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals must be checked as well. 
This is accomplished by estimating the sample and sub-samples deploying the White cross-
section coefficient covariance method in the panel analysis in order to have robust model. 
Comparing the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) coefficient, obtained from the Breusch-Pagan Test, 
with the critical value of chi-squared, it does not indicate that heteroscedasticity in residuals 
is present in this case. 
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4.1.1. Control Variable 
Probability of default of banks 
The global financial crisis, which started in 2008, led many financial institutions and other 
organizations in financial distress or even worse into bankruptcy, among those were 
Washington Mutual and Nothern Rosc., Lehman Brothers and many other entities. According 
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 2015) reports, more than 380 banks 
failed since 2008, leading to the loss of trillions of US dollars. 
According to the Bank of International Settlements (2015) the major reason that led banks 
globally into bankruptcy was the banks’ illiquidity, bad management, capital inadequacy, poor 
asset quality and increase losses. To the date, many studies tested various factors that affect 
banks’ probability of default, among those, Jin et al. (2011), Mayes and Stremmel (2012), 
Altan et al. (2014). Estimating the borrower’s risk level, namely the probability of default (PD), 
by assigning a different PD to each borrower is now widely employed in many banks. The high 
value of PD indicates that an individual or an entity will not be able or willing to meet its 
obligations (Gurny and Gurny, 2013). The false estimation of PD leads to unreasonable rating, 
incorrect pricing of financial instruments and thereby it was one of the causes of the recent 
global financial crisis. Probability of default is also a crucial parameter used in the calculation 
of economic capital or regulatory capital under Basel II for a banking institution. (Gurny and 
Gurny, 2013) 
For all these reasons the estimation of the probability of default of financial institutions, is 
the center of the theme in the field of the financial research, for a long time. There are a lot 
of models estimating the probability of default in financial sector, while the most widely used 
ones are the credit scoring models. These are multivariate models that use the main financial 
indicators of a company as input, attributing a weight to each of them that reflects its relative 
importance in forecasting default.  
These models can be grouped into three categories: a) discriminant analysis (linear, 
quadratic); b) regression models (linear, logit, probit); c) inductive models such as neural 
networks. (Engelmann and Rauhmeier 2006; Green, 2008). The majority of the studies based 
their analysis on Altman et al. (1968), who modeled first the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Specifically, their models are modified based on the theoretical design named 
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CAMELS1, as it was proposed by Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) and is 
applied by National Supervisory Bodies such as Federal Reserve, Bank of England and 
European Central Bank.  
The latest research that used a sample of US banks, in order to estimate the probability of 
default of banks is conducted by S. Charitou (2015). According to the study, a dataset of 268 
US banks it was used for the period of 2009-2014 and it was based on the Altman’s 
discriminant model by modifying it according to the CAMELS ratios discussed above. The 
probability of default it is calculated as follows: 
𝑝 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑧
 
Where z is the logistic regression of the training sample applied to each bank: 
𝑧 = 𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗,𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑖
6
𝑗=1
 
As a result, the final model and its coefficients that it is going to be used in this study is the 
following: 
𝒛 = 𝟐. 𝟓𝟕𝟓 − 𝟎. 𝟑𝟔𝟗𝑪 − 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑𝟔𝑨 + 𝟎. 𝟕𝟔𝟐𝑴 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓𝟖𝑬 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗𝟓𝑳 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓𝟓𝑺 
Where: 
C: Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 
A: Net charge-offs over gross loans 
M: Net interest margin (NIM) 
E: Return on equity (ROE) 
L: Non-current assets to total assets 
S: Net loans to total assets 
The expected relationship between insolvency of the bank and the audit fees charged it was 
mentioned again in this thesis, in the hypothesis development section. A good example for 
the positive expected relationship is mentioned by Francis & Wilson, (1988), who have 
concluded that insolvent banks or in other words banks that are under unhealthy financial 
position, tend to hire Big-N audit firms, in order to increase the confidence of investors and 
                                                          
1 “CAMELS” is the abbreviation of six bank performance indicators namely: Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, 
Management Capability, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to Market Risk. 
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to minimize the risk of litigation. That in turn, suggests increased audit fees, accredited on 
audit fee premium or on the increased risk the auditor engages to. 
4.2. Data Collection and Sample Selection 
In order to obtain the appropriate data needed, data on audit fees was collected from the 
Audit Analytics database. The dataset initially consisted from 1,414 US banks with NAICS code 
5221 that reported audit fees and underwent quality test. Incorporating the criteria of the 
bank to be listed, to exist from 2003 until 2015, the rule of having the same closing date (12th 
month) and by removing the subsidiaries that have the same parent account, dropped down 
the number of the banks to 976. Regarding the financial statement data, the databases used 
were the BankScope and Bloomberg, in addition to the official annual reports of each bank. 
Excluding the banks that were characterized as unavailable for data collecting from the 
aforementioned databases, the number of banks dropped down to 122. 
As a result, the sample under analysis consists of 122 banks in US for the years 2003-2015, 
while it must be mentioned that the sample comprises of banks with SIC codes: 6022 (State 
Commercial Banks), 6021 (National Commercial Banks), 6036 (Savings Institutions, Not 
Federally Chartered) and 6035 (Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered) depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Sample Composition 
 
After collecting all the needed data, firstly the probability of default of each bank is calculated, 
along with the appropriate ratios and figures needed for the audit fees model described in 
the next sections. 
4.3. Measurement 
The variables used in this specific analysis are mentioned in this section along with the 
previous findings of the literature. It worth to be mentioned that all variables have been 
transformed into the natural logarithm form. That is an important strategy followed in OLS 
for three reasons. Firstly, the logarithmic formation reduces the issue of heteroscedasticity. 
Secondly, helps to avoid problems such as the non-stationarity of the variables. Finally, the 
use of logarithmic transformation provides a better fit for outliers within the distribution. 
SIC Code Description Number of Banks
6022 State Commercial Banks 65
6021 National Commercial Banks 50
6036 Savings Institutions, Not Federally Chartered 2
6035 Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered 5
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Other possible transformations, such as the squaring of the variables, have been tested for 
this analysis, although insignificant results were produced. 
4.3.1. Explained Variable 
The variable that is used in this analysis as dependent variable, is audit fees. According to 
previous literatures and researches on this specific variable, the total audit fees has been used 
in its natural logarithmic form (Waresul Karim and Moizer, 1996; Gul, 1999; Taylor and Simon, 
1999). That is due to the fact of achieving a better fit with the rest of the variables in the linear 
regression model. 
4.3.2. Explanatory Variables 
LTA is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets of the bank, while BIG4 is a dummy 
variable defining firms that use Big-4 firms as auditors. These two variables are a measure of 
the auditee and auditor size respectively. The relationship between the fees charged for 
auditing and the firm being audited, has been established in previous researches (Simunic, 
1980; Simon, 1985; Simon & Francis, 1988; Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996; Simon & Taylor, 
2002) and it is expected the coefficient for LTA to be positive. Meaning that as the entity 
grows, the fees charged will increase too. Concerning the auditor size, it was mentioned in 
previous sections that the existence of audit fees premium has been well established by the 
literature (Ebrahim, 2010; Caneghem, 2010), which is an indicator of increased audit fees. 
However, many researches fail to prove that existence (Simunic, 1980), while other studies 
show various mixed results, depending on the model that has been deployed (Simon and 
Francis, 1988). Although, the majority of researches that have been conducted in US, show 
the existence of the audit fee premium. Thus, the relationship between the two variables is 
expected to be positive.  
The next variable used as explanatory is the LSUBS that shows the natural logarithm of 
number of subsidiaries of the bank. LSUBS it is used as a measure of bank’s complexity, 
because as it was mentioned before, increased number of subsidiaries indicates the increased 
organizational cost, complexity. Several analyses resulted in a positive relationship between 
the fees charged and the complexity of the auditee, by various proxies (Simunic, 1980; Simon 
and Francis, 1988; Waresul Karim and Moizer, 1996; Taylor and Simon; 1999). However, the 
most common used proxy is the number of subsidiaries owned (Hay et al., 2006), and this is 
the variable that it is used in this analysis as a proxy of complexity. Thus, the relationship 
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between the audit fees and the bank’s complexity is expected to be positive. Furthermore, 
LNI stands for the natural logarithm of total net income of the bank and is a measure of 
profitability of the bank. According to prior evidence again it is expected a significant and 
positive relationship with audit fees (Menon and Williams, 2001).  
In order to investigate deeper concerning the risks that a bank might face, the model inputs 
the following variables. LCAR is the natural logarithm of capital adequacy ratio and is the main 
proxy for capital risk. Higher values of LCAR are indicative of higher regulatory pressure. 
Meaning that the expected relationship with audit fees is positive (Hay et al., 2006). The 
variable LNPLR is proxy for bank credit risk and according to the aforementioned analysis, 
fees charged will increase in that measure of risk (Hay et al., 2006). LOSS is used as a proxy 
for firm risk and is a dummy variable defining banks that reported net losses the previous 
year. Despite the fact that the expected relationship is a positive one, previous researches’ 
results are mixed.  
Generally, all the risk measures, especially LCAR and LNPLR, are indication of inherent risk of 
the bank as the basis of all the other that are possible to create litigation risk. As it was 
mentioned in the theoretical framework section, this kind of risk is expected to increase the 
audit fees. This happens, either due to the safety net that the auditor tries to create in order 
to avoid future litigation (Taylor and Simon, 1999), or due to the increase in the time spent 
and to the increase in the need for expertise (Simunic, 1980). Several studies pose a positive 
relationship between the litigation risk and audit fees. Weber et al. (2008) in their analysis 
after an audit failure in Germany, an affiliate of KPMG lost clients. In the same notion, but in 
a different country, an affiliate of PwC in Japan, lost a large proportion of their clients again 
after an audit failure (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012).  
These studies show that litigation risk can be an incentive for auditors to provide high quality 
auditing, which in turn means increased audit fees. In general, most studies produce results 
that comply with the aforementioned theory. However, only the LOSS variable is indicated 
with a negative relationship. The expected relationship of all the aforementioned variables it 
is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Expected Relationship between the Variables 
 
4.4. Model Specification 
The latest fee analysis that is related to US banks has been undertaken by Fields et al. (2004), 
who investigated the audit fees’ determinants for 277 US banking institutions. Fields et al. 
(2004) used a model built from characteristics usually used in the audit and fee literature. 
They take audit fees as dependent variable and they regress it on measures of risk, firm size 
and complexity, while controlling for time, industry and auditor quality. In this study the 
notion is the same and in combination with other models that have been used for researches 
in other countries, such as Swanson (2008) and Monsuru (2004), the model used here is 
modified. The modification involves the incorporation of all studied determinants together, 
the bank-related variables of size, risks, profitability and complexities, the auditor-related 
variables of size and change. In addition to the audit engagement characteristic risks.  
The population regression function it is written as: 
𝐲𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝛘𝒊 + 𝛆𝐢 , i=1, 2, 3, …, n 
This formula divides the value of the dependent variable into two parts: the fitted value from 
the model and an error term  𝜺𝜾 ~ 𝒊. 𝒊. 𝒅. 𝜨(𝟎, 𝝈
𝟐). In addition, according to Brooks (2008), 
since Ordinary Least Squares is being put to use, a model with linear connection between the 
parameters and not multiplied, divided, squared, or cubed, is needed. Thus, the final model 
that it is going to be implemented is the following: 
𝐿𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐2𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐3𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐5𝐿𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐6𝐿𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝑐7𝐿𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐8𝐿𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐9𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐10𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Variable Name Indicator Proxy for… Expected Relationship
LAF Natural Logarithm of Audit Fees -
LTA Natural Logarithm of Total Assets Auditee Size +
BIG4 Dummy Coded 1 if incumbent auditor is Big4, 0 otherwise Auditor Size +
AC Dummy Coded 1 if incumbent auditor has been changed , 0 otherwise Auditor Change +
LOSS Dummy Coded 1 when the Bank reports a loss, 0 otherwise Audit Risk +/-
LNI Natural Logarithm of Net Income Auditee Profitability +
LSUBS Natural Logarithm of Consolidated Subsidiaries Auditee Complexity +
LCAR Natural Logarithm Tier 1 Capital Adequacy Ratio Inherent Risk |Capital +
LNPLR Natural Logarithm Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans Inherent Risk |Credit +
PD Probability of Default of Bank (modified z-score Index) Control Variable +
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Where i: the ith bank and t the tth year and 
 
LAF: Natural Logarithm of Audit Fees 
LTA: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
BIG4: 1 Dummy Coded 1 if incumbent auditor is Big-4, 0 otherwise 
AC: Dummy Coded 1 when the Bank changed auditor the current year, 0 otherwise 
LOSS: Dummy Coded 1 when the Bank reports a loss, 0 otherwise 
LNI: Natural Logarithm of Net Income 
LSUBS: Natural Logarithm of Number of Consolidated Subsidiaries 
LCAR: Natural Logarithm of Tier 1 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
LNPLR: Natural Logarithm of Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans 
PD: Probability of Default (modified z-score index) 
YEAR: Year Dummy Variables
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As already mentioned, the recent financial crisis effects on banks’ performance can be 
determined by including in this analysis three different periods; the pre-crisis period, referring 
to the years from 2003 to 2007, the post-crisis period, referring to period (2008-2015) and 
finally the total sample period (2003-2015). Firstly, the descriptive statistics of each sample is 
reported. After that the correlation matrix is reported to check for correlations between the 
variables. In addition, a reverse causality between the insolvency and audit fees is tested with 
the Granger Causality test and finally the regression analysis of all the aforementioned 
periods is performed. 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
At this part, the descriptive statistics of the model and each sub-sample are presented and 
analyzed (Table 3, 4 and 5).2 All variables are expressed in their initial form, without 
transformations, in million dollars except AC, BIG4 and LOSS that are dichotomous dummy 
variables and SUBS that refers to the number of subsidiaries. That is because it is easier to 
extract the meaning of the important statistics, such as the mean values of the variables.  
Table 3: Pre-crisis Sample | Key Descriptive Statistics 
 
                                                          
2 The initial Descriptive statistics as extracted from EViews (including the Year Dummies are presented in the 
Appendix (Table 9, 10 and 11) 
AF AC BIG4 CAR LOSS NI NPLR SUBS TA PD
 Mean 1.60 0.061 0.62 0.13 0.01 490.0 21.97 170.60 40100 -1.31
 Median 0.39 0 1 0.13 0.00 28.3 0 14.00 2620 -1.19
 Maximum 63.60 1 1 0.36 1.00 24600.0 2813 5834.00 219000 3.10
 Minimum 0.02 0 0 0.07 0.00 -141.0 0 0 89.5 -10.3
 Std. Dev. 5.80 0.239 0.485 0.03 0.11 2320.0 242.08 749.28 19700 1.47
 Skewness 7.35 3.681 -0.50 3.05 8.56 7.3 10.95 6.00 7.62 -1.12
 Kurtosis 63.12 14.551 1.25 18.10 74.26 60.3 121.12 39.24 65.16 8.66
 Jarque-Bera 97359.78 4768.96 103.26 6736.06 136525.90 88781.2 366802 37039 104127 941.90
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 977 37 379 82 8.00 299000 13402 104064 2450000 -800
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2050000 35 144 0.54 7.90 3280000 35688768 3420000 2370000 1316
 Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610
Pre-crisis Sample (2003-2007)| Descriptive Statistics
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The pre-crisis sample comprises of 610 observations and it can easily be observed that the 
audit fees have an average of 1.6 million and a standard deviation of 5.8 million. The 
maximum fees charged during the years 2003 and 2007 are 63.60 million dollars and the 
minimum 0.02 million. Furthermore, the average capital adequacy ratio for the 122 banks 
during these years, is 0.13, which denotes a viable bank in terms of capital adequacy 
according to the Basel committee requirements. In addition, the mean values for the net 
income, non-performing loans ratio and total assets are 490, 21.97 and 40100 respectively 
denoting again a normal performance group of banks, on average. Moreover, the dummy 
variables AC, BIG4 and LOSS show that during this period most banks have been audit by a 
BIG4 auditor, did not change an auditor and didn’t report a loss. The SUBS pose a mean value 
of 170.6 denoting a high number of subsidiaries. Finally, the insolvency status of the banks 
can be referred by the PD variable that has a mean value of -1.31. Taking into account that 
the critical point at which the bank can be considered as insolvent is 0 (>50% probability of 
default), on average most banks can be considered as healthy.   
Table 4: Post-crisis Sample | Key Descriptive Statistics 
 
In the same notion the key descriptive statistics of the post-crisis period are presented in table 
4. This sub-sample comprises of 976 observations. During the years 2008 through 2015 the 
audit fees charged increased on average to 2.77 million dollars, maximizing at 96.6 million 
and minimizing at 0.04 million. That could be due to the financial position of the banks that 
AF AC BIG4 CAR LOSS NI NPLR SUBS TA PD
 Mean 2.77 0.065 0.56 0.15 0.11 376.00 36.258 173.89 63900 -1.90
 Median 0.63 0 1 0.15 0.00 33.47 0 16.00 4510 -1.88
 Maximum 96.60 1 1 0.33 1.00 2360.00 7281 5819.00 2270000 16.58
 Minimum 0.04 0 0 0.00 0.00 -28000.00 0 0 318 -8.21
 Std. Dev. 10.38 0.25 0.50 0.03 0.31 2250.00 417.370 754.36 287000 1.58
 Skewness 6.64 3.54 -0.23 1.16 2.57 3.91 12.535 5.93 6.12 1.93
 Kurtosis 49.91 13.56 1.05 7.0 7.59 76.24 171.839 38.35 40.38 26.61
 Jarque-Bera 96662.5 6579.1 162.8 854.9 1930.7 220648.2 1184826.0 56544.6 62900.8 23278.2
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 2700 63 544 147.08 103 367000 35387.9 169716 623000 -1853.55
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1050000 58.93 240.79 0.79 92.1 4950000 170.00 555 8.01 2436.08
 Observations 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976
Post-crisis Sample (2008-2015) | Descriptive Statistics
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can be seen from the decreased NI and the increased NPL Ratio. In addition, more banks 
reported loss and that can be verified from the LOSS dummy variable that increased. 
However, the CAR increased to a figure of 0.15 on average and TA to a figure of 63900 million. 
The number of subsidiaries remained almost stable. Furthermore, most banks did not change 
an auditor and again it can be seen that banks prefer to be audited by a BIG4 auditor. Finally, 
the average value of probability of default decreased further to -1.90, although the maximum 
value of 16.58 in the post-crisis period compared to the 3.10 of the pre-crisis figure, shows 
that probably the insolvency status for some banks worsened.  
However, in order to have a most complete opinion of the situation we must scrutinize the 
whole period before and after the crisis. The key descriptive statistics are presented in the 
next table (Table 5). 
Table 5: Total Sample | Key Descriptive Statistics 
 
The total sample refers to the period from 2003 to 2015 and comprises of 1586 observations. 
The mean value of AF is 2.32 million dollars having a standard deviation of 8.91. During this 
period banks had an average CAR of 0.144, Net Income (NI) 420 million and Total Assets (TA) 
54700 million dollars. In addition, the mean value of the subsidiaries that banks’ owned is 
172.6. The AC, BIG4 and LOSS variables show that most banks did not report losses, were 
audited by a BIG4 auditor and did not change auditors through the years. Finally, the status 
AF AC BIG4 CAR LOSS NI NPLR SUBS TA PD
 Mean 2.318 0.063 0.582 0.144 0.070 420 30.763 172.623 54700 -1.673
 Median 0.533 0 1 0.139 0 30.363 0.012 15.000 3780 -1.605
 Maximum 96.600 1 1 0.359 1 24600 7281 5834 2270000 16.582
 Minimum 0.232 0 0 0.002 0 -28000 0 0 89.536 -10.267
 Std. Dev. 8.914 0.243 0.493 0.030 0.255 2280 360 752.173 256000 1.565
 Skewness 7.306 3.595 -0.332 1.684 3.371 5.274 13.298 5.955 6.649 0.836
 Kurtosis 61.736 13.927 1.110 9.370 12.364 69.823 200.638 38.691 48.157 18.777
 Jarque-Bera 242093.2 11307.9 265.1 3431.2 8797.7 302439.2 2628016.0 93550.9 146440.6 16634.0
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 368000 100.00 923.00 228.59 111.00 666000 48789.45 273780.00 86800000 -2654.04
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1260000 93.69 385.84 1.44 103.23 823000 206.00 897.00 104000 3881.12
 Observations 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586
Total Sample (2003-2015) | Descriptive Statistics
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of most banks can be characterized on average as healthy, since the modified z-score variable 
has a negative average value. 
5.2. Correlations 
The correlation coefficient matrices are reported again for the total sample and the sub-
samples in the Appendix (Tables 12, 13 and 14). At this part the natural logarithm of the 
variables is used as in the final regression models too. Numbers in bold represent the 
statistically significant coefficients at 5% confidence level. 
Scrutinizing all three matrices, as most pairs of correlations show either a low or an 
insignificant correlation, multicollinearity will not be an issue for most of the variables. 
However, there is a strong relationship between the LOSS and LNI and the relationship 
between LTA and LSUBS. Strong correlations are an indication of multicollinearity. Thus, in 
order to be totally ensured about the existence of multicollinearity, a VIF-test was performed 
and the results suggest that there is no multicollinearity. The first strong correlation 
mentioned, can be attributed in the way that LOSS has been computed. The latter, it can be 
inferred as normal and expected because the greater the number the subsidiaries a banks 
owns, the figure of total assets of the bank will increase. Finally, the only moderate 
relationship between the independent variables is indicated between the PD and LCAR, which 
can be again attributed in the calculation of PD. In particular, the probability of default of a 
bank incorporates in its calculation the capital adequacy ratio, as explained before, and that 
can explain the negative correlation coefficient.  
Having analyzed the relationships observed between the independent variables it is time to 
proceed to the correlation coefficients between the explained variable (LAF) and the 
explanatory variables. 
Concerning the pre-crisis sample, numerous variables show a positive correlation with LAF, 
meaning that if LAF increases the indicative paired variable will increase too and vice versa. 
The variables that experience a positive correlation are the BIG4, LNI, LNPLR, LOSS, LSUBS and 
LTA. The remaining two, AC and LCAR, have a negative relationship. The correlation between 
LAF and PD is positive, posing a value of 0,47, a fact indicating a moderately strong positive 
relationship. However, statistically significant at 5% sig. level, are only the BIG4, LCAR, LNI, 
LSUBS, LTA and PD. 
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The same pattern can be easily observed in the post-crisis sample, with the difference that 
LCAR here shows a positive relationship with LAF, while LOSS and LCAR variables are the only 
insignificant correlations between them and the LAF variable. The variable of interest, PD, 
continues to have a positive relationship with LAF. However, the correlation is not as strong 
as in the previous years (0.17). 
Taking into consideration all the periods, including the years from 2003 to 2015, we can see 
that all variables have a statistically significant correlation coefficient with LAF, except the 
LCAR and LOSS. The AC is the only with a negative relationship with LAF but it is a weak one 
(-0.0846), while all the others experience a positive one. The variable of interest, PD, has again 
a positive correlation and a weak one at the point of 0.243. 
What it is worth noticing in all periods is the strong positive relationship between LTA with 
LAF and LSUBS with LAF. Taking into account previous researches on determinants of audit 
pricing (Simunic, 1980; Simon & Francis, 1988; Menon and Williams, 2001), who suggested 
that the size of the auditee would have a strong impact on audit fees, it seems plausible to 
have a relationship between LTA and LAF displaying result like these. As LAF is strongly 
correlated to both LTA and LSUBS, seems reasonable to expect that in the increase of the 
entity’s size and complexity, the audit fees will be higher. 
5.3. Causality Testing 
After analyzing the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients between the variables 
and before the regression analysis, the existence of causality between the variables is going 
to be checked. Despite the fact that the results present a causality test between each variable 
used in the analysis (attached in the appendix), the important variables that are going to be 
analyzed and discussed, are the audit fees and the banks’ insolvency status. The expected 
causality between the two aforementioned variables is the insolvency status to cause the 
audit fees. However, in order to verify that and also check for the inverse causality too, the 
Granger Causality test it is going to be implemented. The results and the explanations of them 
are presented in this section of the thesis and are again categorized in three groups as the 
datasets are divided (pre-crisis, post-crisis, and whole period).3 
                                                          
3 The initial results of the Granger Causality Test for all the variables, are presented in the Appendix in Table 15. 
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Table 6: Granger Causality Test for LAF and PD 
 
As it can be seen from the results in Table 6, using the 5% significance level, in the pre-crises 
and in the post-crises period, the probability of default of a bank Granger causes the audit 
fees charged (LAF). That is also happening for the whole period, only by using the 10% 
significance level.  That is extracted from the probabilities of the tests, which indicate that the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. Meaning that the expected relationship of PD causing LAF is 
observed in all periods, as it was expected according to previous literature. 
However, the reverse causality is being tested as well and it can easily be inferred that there 
is also a reverse causality of LAF causing the PD, only in the pre-crisis period and in the total 
sample period from 2003 to 2015. These results indicate that the insolvent banks will be 
charged increased audit fees compared to a healthy one, but also the increased audit fees 
may cause a bank to deteriorate its financial position, or in other words, increase its 
probability of going bankrupt. 
5.4. Regression Analysis 
As it was mentioned before, after performing tests in order to decide which model is the most 
appropriate in each sample (pooled, fixed or random cross-sectional effect) and after the 
problem checking tests for each one of the three datasets, the final models under analysis 
are presented in this section. The models are controlled for time using the dummy variables 
method, so there is no point in checking for the period fixed or random effects. In each 
regression the first year dummy and the last year dummy were excluded in order to avoid the 
 Nul l  Hypothes is : Obs F-Statis tic Prob. 
 PD does  not Granger Cause LAF 366 3.168 0.038
 LAF does  not Granger Cause PD 3.985 0.019
 Nul l  Hypothes is : Obs F-Statis tic Prob. 
 PD does  not Granger Cause LAF 732 4.506 0.011
 LAF does  not Granger Cause PD 2.212 0.110
 Nul l  Hypothes is : Obs F-Statis tic Prob. 
 PD does  not Granger Cause LAF 1342 2.992 0.066
 LAF does  not Granger Cause PD 4.509 0.011
Pre-Crisis Sample (2003-2015) | Granger Causality Test
Post-Crisis Sample (2008-2015) | Granger Causality Test
Total Sample (2003-2015) | Granger Causality Test
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dummy variable trap. The datasets presented are again the pre-crisis (2003-2007), the post-
crisis (2008-2015) and the whole period (2003-2015).4 
Table 7: Final Regression Model for the Pre-crisis and the Post-crisis sample 
 
Firstly, in the regression analysis are presented the results from the two sub-samples, 
concerning the pre and post-crisis periods respectively (Table 7).  
Regarding the period from 2003 to 2008, the regression has R2 with a figure of 99% and 
Adjusted R2 98.7%, which means that the variation in the dependent variable is highly 
                                                          
4 Results from the regression analysis (as extracted from EViews) for the two sub-samples are presented in the 
Appendix in Table 16 and the Redundant Fixed Effect Test outputs are presented in Table 18.  
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant 4.75676 1.46867 3.23883 0.00130 Constant 3.07858 0.33601 9.16222 0.00000
AC 0.04198 0.02542 1.65113 0.09940 AC 0.01154 0.01810 0.63777 0.52380
BIG4 0.12587 0.03176 3.96364 0.00010 BIG4 0.32423 0.03222 10.06189 0.00000
LCAR 0.20070 0.13474 1.48953 0.13700 LCAR 0.07244 0.03033 2.38873 0.01710
LNI -0.03002 0.01713 -1.75273 0.08030 LNI -0.00241 0.00124 -1.93459 0.05340
LNPLR 0.00716 0.01225 0.58412 0.55940 LNPLR 0.00218 0.00518 0.42030 0.67440
LOSS -0.66055 0.53568 -1.23312 0.21810 LOSS -0.08899 0.03575 -2.48905 0.01300
LSUBS 0.05264 0.01957 2.69023 0.00740 LSUBS 0.00956 0.02080 0.45949 0.64600
LTA 0.39154 0.05934 6.59784 0.00000 LTA 0.46251 0.01713 27.00511 0.00000
PD 0.08013 0.02169 3.69488 0.00020 PD 0.00743 0.00483 1.53945 0.12410
D2 0.52295 0.01417 36.90388 0.00000 D6 -0.14221 0.01723 -8.25453 0.00000
D3 0.52855 0.01595 33.13852 0.00000 D7 -0.11878 0.01822 -6.52054 0.00000
D4 0.55868 0.01683 33.20120 0.00000 D8 -0.11444 0.01540 -7.43137 0.00000
D5 0.56207 0.01778 31.60765 0.00000 D9 -0.07892 0.01133 -6.96554 0.00000
D10 -0.06222 0.00800 -7.77361 0.00000
D11 -0.02459 0.00585 -4.20359 0.00000
D12 -0.02605 0.00291 -8.96744 0.00000
Adjusted R-squared
Prob(F-statistic)
Durbin-Watson stat.
0.996308
0.995705
0
1.952149
Pre-Crisis Sample (2003-2007) | Final Regression Model
LAF
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Prob(F-statistic)
0.990039
0.987229
0
Dependent
Independent
2.094039Durbin-Watson stat.
Post-Crisis Sample (2008-2015) | Final Regression Model
Dependent
LAF
Independent
R-squared
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explained by the variation of the independent variables. A value of R-squared almost 0.99 
suggests that the deployed audit fee model explains about 99% of the variance in audit fees. 
The unexplained variance can be due to two reasons, either from circumstances that the 
model fails to explain or from untested independent variables. The observed probability of F-
statistic (0.00) indicates the high significance of the model. Finally, the durbin-watson stat. is 
approximately equal to 2, which indicated that there is no problem of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. In the same notion, the results for the period of 2008-2015 can be explained and 
are almost the same with the pre-crisis results.  
Concerning the independent variables, it can easily be observed that all the determinants’ 
proxies, in both samples, have a positive impact on audit fees, except the LNI and LOSS 
variables. Meaning that an increase in these variables (AC, BIG4, LCAR, LNPLR, LSUBS, LTA and 
PD), will increase the audit fees charged. The exact opposite applies for the LNI and LOSS that 
an increase will lead to lower audit fees charged. However, not all the variables are 
statistically significant. Statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, or by using α=5%, is 
every variable that has a prob. lower than 0.05. For the pre-crisis sample, the significant ones 
at a 5% level, are the Constant, BIG4, LSUBS, LTA and PD and the rest are not significant. 
Considering the post-crisis sample, a change can be noticed in coefficients’ significance. Only 
the Constant, BIG4, and LTA can be considered significant. 
As a result, there is a difference in what determines the audit fees that banks in US are 
charged prior and after the financial crisis. More precisely, not only the auditors do not take 
into consideration all the characteristics of the bank and of the engagement characteristics, 
but in addition, after the crisis the impact of AC, LCAR, LNI, LNPLR, LOSS, LSUBS and PD on 
audit fees, decreased significantly. Besides, BIG4 and LTA have a slightly greater impact on 
audit fees after the financial crisis.  
Considering the control variable of the model, as it was mentioned previously, while auditors 
considered the insolvency status of a bank a significant factor affecting the fees charged, after 
the financial crisis took place (2008) they did not consider it a significant factor anymore. 
Nevertheless, the impact of probability of default of banks on audit fees has been (0.08013) 
and it still be (0.00743) very low.    
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Finally, year dummy variables were used in order to control for time in the analysis and the 
meaning of them is to see if the fees charged during the years under investigation differ in 
each year from the average fees that are being charged. In the sub-samples there is no 
impressive difference in the results. Thus, the interpretation of the dummies follows in the 
next paragraphs that concern the final model, which includes all the years being under 
analysis. 5 
Table 8: Final Regression Model for the Total Sample 
 
The results depicted in Table 8, include all 122 US banks and 13 years of data (2003-2015). 
Again a cross-section fixed effect model was used as the best for the analysis according to 
                                                          
5 The results from the regression analysis (as extracted from EViews) are depicted in the Appendix in Table 17, 
while the Haussmann Random Effects Test and the Redundant Fixed Effects Model are presented in Table 19. 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant -5.18141 1.27212 -4.07306 0.00000
AC 0.03932 0.02216 1.77467 0.07620
BIG4 0.18959 0.02199 8.62044 0.00000
LCAR 0.20371 0.06856 2.97121 0.00300
LNI -0.00247 0.00103 -2.39204 0.01690
LNPLR 0.04464 0.01432 3.11689 0.00190
LOSS -0.09675 0.04334 -2.23216 0.02580
LSUBS 0.03568 0.01886 1.89209 0.05870
LTA 0.83686 0.06008 13.92964 0.00000
PD 0.02243 0.00840 2.67005 0.00770
D2 0.30796 0.09971 3.08846 0.00210
D3 0.28641 0.10065 2.84561 0.00450
D4 0.25938 0.09851 2.63314 0.00860
D5 0.24364 0.09532 2.55600 0.01070
D6 0.17349 0.09280 1.86961 0.06170
D7 0.14866 0.09186 1.61830 0.10580
D8 0.11083 0.09297 1.19207 0.23340
D9 0.12094 0.09427 1.28285 0.19980
D10 0.13944 0.09464 1.47341 0.14090
D11 0.15562 0.09572 1.62567 0.10420
D12 0.14236 0.09705 1.46677 0.14270
Total Sample (2003-2015) | Final Regression Model
Dependent
LAF
Independent
Durbin-Watson stat.
0.937131
0.936328
0
2.190852
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Prob(F-statistic)
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tests. The outcomes indicate a high significance model (prob. Of F-statistic equal to 0) and 
almost the 93.7% of LAF variations are explained by the variations in the independent 
variables. The year dummies that are included have to do with all the years individually, 
except the first and the last for reasons explained before in this thesis. Finally, the d-w stat. 
is again near to the value of 2, which indicates that the autocorrelation in the residuals, is 
probably not present.  
All the variables are statistically significant at 5% (prob. is lower than 0.05) besides the LSUBS 
and the AC. The variables with a positive effect on audit fees are AC, BIG4, LCAR, LNPLR, 
LSUBS, LTA and PD, while the ones with a negative effect are the LNI, LOSS and the Constant. 
That means that an increase in capital adequacy ratio or in non-performing loans ratio or in 
the number of subsidiaries owned by the bank or in total assets of the bank or in the 
probability of default of the entity, will increase the audit fees and vice versa. On the other 
hand, an increase in the net income of the bank or the frequency the bank reports a loss will 
decrease the audit fees charged and vice versa. The results are almost as expected according 
to the theory and the previous literature besides the relationship of LAF and net income that 
it seems to have a negative one according to the model. 
The year dummies used in this model in order to control for time are not statistically 
significant. Although, the results show that during the first 5 years of the analysis (pre-crisis), 
the audit fees were more than 20% higher than the average, while post-crisis were under 17% 
greater than the average. That depicts the differences on audit fees charged before and after 
the financial crisis of 2008. 
To summarize, the auditee and auditor characteristics as the audit engagement characteristic 
risks seem to have a significant and positive impact on audit fees. The opposite seems to 
derive only from an auditee characteristic, the profitability of the bank and from the audit 
engagement characteristic, the inherent risk. As far as the insolvency of the bank seems to 
have a statistically significant relationship with fees charged, meaning that auditors take into 
account whether if the bank that is going to be audited is healthy or not. However, the impact 
seems to be weak (0.02243). That means that if the modified z-score increases by 1 unit, 
ceteris paribus, the audit fees will increase by almost 2%, a number that can be considered 
low figure compared to the other variables that seem to be more significant.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The final section of the thesis is devoted in the conclusions drawn from the analysis, while it 
discusses the limitations that appeared during this dissertation and presents areas that could 
be the base for further research in the field of audit fees determinants. 
6.1. Conclusions 
This analysis examines the determinants of audit fees for US banks in general. However more 
specifically, the main aim of this study is to determine the impact of the insolvency status of 
a bank on the audit pricing and the change of the determinants after the financial crisis of 
2008. Examining disclosed audit fees in the US banking sector for the years 2003-2015 and in 
a specific way (creating sub-samples) in order to capture the relationship mentioned above, 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the relationship between the audit 
pricing and the insolvency status of a bank. Furthermore, captures the differences that the 
world financial crisis brought to the financial system.  
The main hypothesis developed during the analysis, can be accepted based on the results as 
the probability of a bank going bankrupt, which is the variable used as proxy for the insolvency 
status of banks, displayed a statistically significant positive relationship with audit fees. 
Despite the existence that there is a relationship between the aforementioned variables, the 
impact on one on another is very low. In consensus with the previous literature the rest of 
the variables that have been used in order to construct the model used, a positive relationship 
was established with auditee and auditor size, auditee complexity and risk and audit 
engagement characteristic risk. Opposed to the previous findings were the auditee 
profitability proxy, which according to these empirical findings seems to experience a 
negative relationship with audit fees.  
The conjecture of the impact of the world financial crisis, it was also put to test and it seems 
to have a severe impact on audit pricing. The way that auditors were pricing the audit act and 
what the auditor considered as important, is different compared to the pre-crisis period. The 
results suggest that the auditee and auditor size in the post-crisis period are more important 
and the audit fees charged for a BIG4 auditor or for a larger, in terms of total assets, bank will 
be higher. While the insolvency status of the bank was important in the pre-crisis period, after 
2008 seems that the auditors do not consider it as a significant variable in the audit pricing 
process. 
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Finally, an interesting result is the evidence of the reverse causality that has been reported 
between the audit fees and the probability of a bank going bankrupt. By implementing the 
appropriate statistical test, it was empirically found that during pre-crisis period, post-crisis 
and during all years being under investigation the insolvency status of bank causes the audit 
fees, which was in line with theory. However, has also been found that the opposite could 
happen. The audit fees in some cases might cause a bank to go insolvent.  
6.2. Limitations 
During the analysis, various limitations have arisen. Firstly, the study is implemented using 
the US bank setting, which can be considered as an abundant database in terms of data 
availability. However, due to difficulties in data collecting (mentioned in the data collection 
section), the object of this study is limited to the listed banks from 2003 to 2015, so the 
representation of the conclusion could be considered as limited as well. Secondly, the 
variables utilized by this thesis did not include all the affecting factors for audit fees, so the 
existence of other factors that have not been identified and put to test is probable. These 
could be the impact from non-audit services, regional differences, industries difference and 
so on. Finally, the use of an extended time period does encompass its benefits, such as to 
capture also the effect of the S-O Act on audit fees, but also faces its weaknesses and 
difficulties in managing a larger and more complex dataset.  
6.3. Suggestions 
In the particular research, the analysis has been performed regarding the years 2003 to 2015. 
Thus, in the future research, the sample used for the analysis, can be extended back in years 
in order to capture the effect of the probability of default of banks on audit fees before the 
S-O Act. Secondly, this thesis discusses the problems about audit fees for listed US banks. 
However, for US small and medium banks, the impact factors on audit fees and especially of 
insolvency status, still need future discussion. Furthermore, it is suggested that future studies 
should incorporate even more variables in the model, in order to have a more holistic 
consensus about the audit fees determinants and the exact impact of each category. Finally, 
the findings of this research suggest that there is a reverse causality between the two 
variables. Meaning that the audit fees, in some cases, can in a way cause a bank to go 
bankrupt. These findings are interesting and further studies investigating these results are 
necessary, in order to understand the underlying reasons and contribute to the literature by 
identifying the way that causality occurs. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 9: Initial Table for Pre-crisis Descriptive Statistics 
 
AF D2 D3 D4 D5 AC BIG4 CAR LOSS NI NPLR SUBS TA PD
 Mean 1.60 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.061 0.62 0.13 0.01 490.0 21.97 170.60 40100 -1.31
 Median 0.39 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0.00 28.3 0 14.00 2620 -1.19
 Maximum 63.60 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.36 1.00 24600.0 2813 5834.00 219000 3.10
 Minimum 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.00 -141.0 0 0 89.5 -10.3
 Std. Dev. 5.80 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.239 0.485 0.03 0.11 2320.0 242.08 749.28 19700 1.47
 Skewness 7.35 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 3.681 -0.50 3.05 8.56 7.3 10.95 6.00 7.62 -1.12
 Kurtosis 63.12 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 14.551 1.25 18.10 74.26 60.3 121.12 39.24 65.16 8.66
 Jarque-Bera 97359.78 230.34 230.34 230.34 230.34 4768.96 103.26 6736.06 136525.90 88781.2 366802 37039 104127 941.90
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 977 122 122 122 122 37 379 82 8.00 299000 13402 104064 2450000 -800
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2050000 98 98 98 98 35 144 0.54 7.90 3280000 35688768 3420000 2370000 1316
 Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610
Pre-crises Sample (2003-2007)| Descriptive Statistics
  
II 
Table 10: Initial Table for Post-crisis Descriptive Statistics 
 
AF D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 AC BIG4 CAR LOSS NI NPLR SUBS TA PD
 Mean 2.77 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.065 0.56 0.15 0.11 376.00 36.258 173.89 63900 -1.90
 Median 0.63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.15 0.00 33.47 0 16.00 4510 -1.88
 Maximum 96.60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.33 1.00 2360.00 7281 5819.00 2270000 16.58
 Minimum 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 -28000.00 0 0 318 -8.21
 Std. Dev. 10.38 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.03 0.31 2250.00 417.370 754.36 287000 1.58
 Skewness 6.64 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 3.54 -0.23 1.16 2.57 3.91 12.535 5.93 6.12 1.93
 Kurtosis 49.91 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.14 13.56 1.05 7.0 7.59 76.24 171.839 38.35 40.38 26.61
 Jarque-Bera 96662.5 1238.3 1238.3 1238.3 1238.3 1238.3 1238.3 1238.3 6579.1 162.8 854.9 1930.7 220648.2 1184826.0 56544.6 62900.8 23278.2
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 2700 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 63 544 147.08 103 367000 35387.9 169716 623000 -1853.55
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1050000 106.75 106.75 106.75 106.75 106.75 106.75 106.75 58.93 240.79 0.79 92.1 4950000 170.00 555 8.01 2436.08
 Observations 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976
Post-crises Sample (2008-2015) | Descriptive Statistics
  
III 
Table 11: Initial Table for Total Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
AF D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 AC BIG4 CAR LOSS NI NPLR SUBS TA PD
 Mean 2.318 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.063 0.582 0.144 0.070 420 30.763 172.623 54700 -1.673
 Median 0.533 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.139 0 30.363 0.012 15.000 3780 -1.605
 Maximum 96.600 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.359 1 24600 7281 5834 2270000 16.582
 Minimum 0.232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 -28000 0 0 89.536 -10.267
 Std. Dev. 8.914 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.267 0.243 0.493 0.030 0.255 2280 360 752.173 256000 1.565
 Skewness 7.306 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.595 -0.332 1.684 3.371 5.274 13.298 5.955 6.649 0.836
 Kurtosis 61.736 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 11.083 13.927 1.110 9.370 12.364 69.823 200.638 38.691 48.157 18.777
 Jarque-Bera 242093.2 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 6983.3 11307.9 265.1 3431.2 8797.7 302439.2 2628016.0 93550.9 146440.6 16634.0
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Sum 368000 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 122.00 100.00 923.00 228.59 111.00 666000 48789.45 273780.00 86800000 -2654.04
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1260000 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 112.62 93.69 385.84 1.44 103.23 823000 206.00 897.00 104000 3881.12
 Observations 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586 1586
Total Sample (2003-2015) | Descriptive Statistics
  
IV 
Table 12: Pre-crisis | Correlation Coefficents 
 
Correlation LAF D2 D3 D4 D5 AC BIG4 LCAR LNI LNPLR LOSS LSUBS LTA PD 
LAF 1.0000
D2 0.0149 1.0000
D3 0.0417 -0.2500 1.0000
D4 0.0674 -0.2500 -0.2500 1.0000
D5 0.0875 -0.2500 -0.2500 -0.2500 1.0000
AC -0.0232 0.0446 0.0103 0.0275 0.0446 1.0000
BIG4 0.5627 0.0524 0.0017 -0.0575 -0.0659 -0.1839 1.0000
LCAR -0.1975 0.0665 0.0230 -0.0316 -0.1858 0.0291 -0.0153 1.0000
LNI 0.3216 -0.0040 0.0068 0.0368 -0.0438 0.0044 0.1859 -0.0364 1.0000
LNPLR 0.0403 -0.0191 -0.0911 -0.0374 0.0957 -0.0110 0.0386 0.0734 -0.0559 1.0000
LOSS 0.0209 0.0144 0.0144 -0.0576 0.0504 -0.0293 0.0009 -0.0833 -0.8659 0.0537 1.0000
LSUBS 0.7912 -0.0464 0.0057 0.0487 0.0805 -0.0326 0.4163 -0.1917 0.3569 0.0475 -0.0521 1.0000
LTA 0.9210 -0.0277 0.0032 0.0320 0.0600 -0.0471 0.5097 -0.2060 0.4202 0.0175 -0.0454 0.8103 1.0000
PD 0.4727 -0.0609 -0.0111 -0.0012 0.0814 -0.0587 0.2109 -0.6293 0.1219 -0.0774 0.0988 0.4842 0.4385 1.0000
Pre-Crisis Sample (2003-2007) | Correlation Coefficient
  
V 
Table 13: Post-crisis | Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation LAF D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 AC BIG4 LCAR LNI LNPLR LOSS LSUBS LTA PD 
LAF 1.0000
D6 -0.0511 1.0000
D7 -0.0318 -0.1429 1.0000
D8 -0.0311 -0.1429 -0.1429 1.0000
D9 -0.0099 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 1.0000
D10 0.0015 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 1.0000
D11 0.0225 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 1.0000
D12 0.0415 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 -0.1429 1.0000
AC -0.1264 0.0898 -0.0362 -0.0362 -0.0362 0.0016 -0.0110 -0.0110 1.0000
BIG4 0.6336 0.0000 -0.0062 -0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0187 0.0062 -0.1856 1.0000
LCAR 0.0408 -0.2257 -0.0445 0.0762 0.1222 0.0799 0.0436 0.0055 -0.0331 -0.0567 1.0000
LNI 0.0849 -0.0725 -0.3082 -0.1038 0.0592 0.0667 0.1185 0.1185 0.0184 0.0547 0.0817 1.0000
LNPLR 0.0784 -0.1255 0.0800 0.1143 0.0985 0.0477 -0.0184 -0.0765 -0.0626 0.0291 0.0920 -0.1949 1.0000
LOSS 0.0205 0.0416 0.3038 0.1021 -0.0592 -0.0492 -0.1197 -0.1097 -0.0359 0.0040 -0.0782 -0.9292 0.1970 1.0000
LSUBS 0.8003 0.0551 0.0554 0.0370 0.0094 -0.0107 -0.0300 -0.0516 -0.1091 0.4558 0.0228 0.0691 0.0520 0.0433 1.0000
LTA 0.9487 -0.0392 -0.0304 -0.0258 -0.0125 -0.0004 0.0125 0.0371 -0.1281 0.5692 0.0115 0.1244 0.0199 -0.0100 0.8350 1.0000
PD 0.1712 0.1768 0.1033 0.0017 -0.0651 -0.0615 -0.0559 -0.0551 0.0108 0.1106 -0.5170 -0.2043 -0.0338 0.2247 0.2446 0.1774 1.0000
Post-Crisis Sample (2008-2015) | Correlation Coefficient
  
VI 
Table 14: Total Sample | Correlation Coefficient 
 
Correlation LAF D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 AC BIG4 LCAR LNI LNPLR LOSS LSUBS LTA PD 
LAF 1.0000
D2 -0.0531 1.0000
D3 -0.0378 -0.0833 1.0000
D4 -0.0231 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D5 -0.0116 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D6 0.0003 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D7 0.0147 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D8 0.0153 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D9 0.0311 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D10 0.0397 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D11 0.0554 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
D12 0.0696 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.0833 1.0000
AC -0.0846 0.0225 0.0030 0.0127 0.0225 0.0711 -0.0262 -0.0262 -0.0262 0.0030 -0.0067 -0.0067 1.0000
BIG4 0.5859 0.0528 0.0240 -0.0096 -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0192 -0.0192 -0.0144 -0.0144 0.0000 -0.0096 -0.1851 1.0000
LCAR 0.0070 -0.0646 -0.0857 -0.1122 -0.1870 -0.1178 0.0254 0.1207 0.1571 0.1237 0.0950 0.0649 -0.0100 -0.0579 1.0000
LNI 0.0934 0.0587 0.0618 0.0702 0.0475 -0.1037 -0.3192 -0.1324 0.0167 0.0236 0.0710 0.0709 0.0133 0.0851 0.0131 1.0000
LNPLR 0.1315 -0.1772 -0.2177 -0.1875 -0.1128 0.0241 0.1550 0.1769 0.1668 0.1344 0.0924 0.0553 -0.0330 0.0005 0.1928 -0.2047 1.0000
LOSS 0.0482 -0.0606 -0.0606 -0.0792 -0.0514 0.0785 0.3196 0.1341 -0.0143 -0.0050 -0.0699 -0.0606 -0.0305 -0.0080 -0.0252 -0.9256 0.2111 1.0000
LSUBS 0.7902 -0.0396 -0.0087 0.0169 0.0358 0.0488 0.0490 0.0353 0.0146 -0.0004 -0.0150 -0.0311 -0.0790 0.4369 -0.0408 0.1133 0.0595 0.0281 1.0000
LTA 0.9389 -0.0666 -0.0488 -0.0322 -0.0161 0.0022 0.0088 0.0123 0.0223 0.0313 0.0411 0.0596 -0.0952 0.5313 -0.0224 0.1461 0.0798 0.0094 0.8212 1.0000
PD 0.2429 0.0336 0.0606 0.0660 0.1108 0.0947 0.0380 -0.0403 -0.0919 -0.0891 -0.0848 -0.0841 -0.0154 0.1556 -0.5716 -0.1007 -0.1279 0.1519 0.3229 0.2414 1.0000
Total Sample (2003-2015) | Correlation Coefficient
  
VII 
Table 15: Pre-crisis, Post-crisis & Total Sample | Granger Causality Test 
 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 AC does not Granger Cause LAF 366 0.334 0.717  AC does not Granger Cause LAF 732 0.129 0.879  AC does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 0.212 0.809
 LAF does not Granger Cause AC 1.553 0.213  LAF does not Granger Cause AC 7.267 0.001  LAF does not Granger Cause AC 9.054 0.000
 BIG4 does not Granger Cause LAF 366 1.513 0.222  BIG4 does not Granger Cause LAF 732 1.908 0.149  BIG4 does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 3.193 0.041
 LAF does not Granger Cause BIG4 6.262 0.002  LAF does not Granger Cause BIG4 3.571 0.029  LAF does not Granger Cause BIG4 13.942 0.000
 LCAR does not Granger Cause LAF 366 0.450 0.638  LCAR does not Granger Cause LAF 732 3.816 0.023  LCAR does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 2.972 0.052
 LAF does not Granger Cause LCAR 1.080 0.341  LAF does not Granger Cause LCAR 0.378 0.685  LAF does not Granger Cause LCAR 9.972 0.000
 LNI does not Granger Cause LAF 366 17.878 0.000  LNI does not Granger Cause LAF 732 1.208 0.299  LNI does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 3.480 0.031
 LAF does not Granger Cause LNI 5.791 0.003  LAF does not Granger Cause LNI 8.679 0.000  LAF does not Granger Cause LNI 2.358 0.095
 LNPLR does not Granger Cause LAF 366 0.575 0.563  LNPLR does not Granger Cause LAF 732 1.977 0.139  LNPLR does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 3.422 0.033
 LAF does not Granger Cause LNPLR 3.619 0.028  LAF does not Granger Cause LNPLR 0.037 0.964  LAF does not Granger Cause LNPLR 6.584 0.001
 LOSS does not Granger Cause LAF 366 16.116 0.000  LOSS does not Granger Cause LAF 732 0.697 0.498  LOSS does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 1.903 0.150
 LAF does not Granger Cause LOSS 1.846 0.159  LAF does not Granger Cause LOSS 0.923 0.398  LAF does not Granger Cause LOSS 0.897 0.408
 LSUBS does not Granger Cause LAF 366 8.462 0.000  LSUBS does not Granger Cause LAF 732 4.035 0.018  LSUBS does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 13.920 0.000
 LAF does not Granger Cause LSUBS 0.133 0.875  LAF does not Granger Cause LSUBS 6.707 0.001  LAF does not Granger Cause LSUBS 11.265 0.000
 LTA does not Granger Cause LAF 366 22.614 0.000  LTA does not Granger Cause LAF 732 15.347 0.000  LTA does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 45.352 0.000
 LAF does not Granger Cause LTA 0.543 0.581  LAF does not Granger Cause LTA 0.070 0.932  LAF does not Granger Cause LTA 1.910 0.149
 PD does not Granger Cause LAF 366 3.168 0.038  PD does not Granger Cause LAF 732 4.506 0.011  PD does not Granger Cause LAF 1342 2.992 0.066
 LAF does not Granger Cause PD 3.985 0.019  LAF does not Granger Cause PD 2.212 0.110  LAF does not Granger Cause PD 4.509 0.011
Pre-Crisis Sample (2003-2015) | Granger Causality Test Post-Crisis Sample (2008-2015) | Granger Causality Test Total Sample (2003-2015) | Granger Causality Test
  
VIII 
Table 16: Pre-crisis & Post-crisis | Regressions Results (as Extracted from EViews)  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
AC 0.04198 0.02542 1.65113 0.09940 D6 -0.14221 0.01723 -8.25453 0.00000
BIG4 0.12587 0.03176 3.96364 0.00010 D7 -0.11878 0.01822 -6.52054 0.00000
LCAR 0.20070 0.13474 1.48953 0.13700 D8 -0.11444 0.01540 -7.43137 0.00000
LNI -0.03002 0.01713 -1.75273 0.08030 D9 -0.07892 0.01133 -6.96554 0.00000
LNPLR 0.00716 0.01225 0.58412 0.55940 D10 -0.06222 0.00800 -7.77361 0.00000
LOSS -0.66055 0.53568 -1.23312 0.21810 D11 -0.02459 0.00585 -4.20359 0.00000
LSUBS 0.05264 0.01957 2.69023 0.00740 D12 -0.02605 0.00291 -8.96744 0.00000
LTA 0.39154 0.05934 6.59784 0.00000 AC 0.01154 0.01810 0.63777 0.52380
PD 0.08013 0.02169 3.69488 0.00020 BIG4 0.32423 0.03222 10.06189 0.00000
D2 0.52295 0.01417 36.90388 0.00000 LCAR 0.07244 0.03033 2.38873 0.01710
D3 0.52855 0.01595 33.13852 0.00000 LNI -0.00241 0.00124 -1.93459 0.05340
D4 0.55868 0.01683 33.20120 0.00000 LNPLR 0.00218 0.00518 0.42030 0.67440
D5 0.56207 0.01778 31.60765 0.00000 LOSS -0.08899 0.03575 -2.48905 0.01300
C 4.75676 1.46867 3.23883 0.00130 LSUBS 0.00956 0.02080 0.45949 0.64600
LTA 0.46251 0.01713 27.00511 0.00000
PD 0.00743 0.00483 1.53945 0.12410
C 3.07858 0.33601 9.16222 0.00000
R-squared 0.990039 19.65141
Adjusted R-squared 0.987229 10.84602
S.E. of regression 0.226769 24.42647
F-statistic 352.3174 2.094039 R-squared 0.996308 21.19346
Prob(F-statistic) 0 Adjusted R-squared0.995705 11.74379
S.E. of regression0.170322 24.31000
F-statistic 1650.737 1.95215
R-squared 0.974959 12.99620 Prob(F-statistic) 0
Sum squared resid 25.11082 2.016313
R-squared 0.983431 13.44495
Sum squared resid26.00625 1.539295
Dependent Variable: LAF
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/20/16   Time: 23:43
Sample: 2003 2007
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 122
Total panel (balanced) observations: 610
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Weighted Statistics
Unweighted Statistics
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Durbin-Watson stat
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Effects Specification
Weighted Statistics
Unweighted Statistics
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Durbin-Watson stat
    Mean dependent var
    Durbin-Watson stat
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Effects Specification
    Mean dependent var
    Durbin-Watson stat
Dependent Variable: LAF
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 10/20/16   Time: 23:45
Sample: 2008 2015
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 122
Total panel (balanced) observations: 976
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
  
IX 
Table 17: Total Sample | Pooled, Fixed Effect & Random Effect Regression Results 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D2 0.22787 0.180274 1.264017 0.2064 D2 0.30796 0.09971 3.08846 0.00210 D2 0.27558 0.16460 1.67421 0.09430
D3 0.227097 0.179533 1.264931 0.2061 D3 0.28641 0.10065 2.84561 0.00450 D3 0.29906 0.16358 1.82818 0.06770
D4 0.225331 0.178487 1.262454 0.207 D4 0.25938 0.09851 2.63314 0.00860 D4 0.29871 0.15941 1.87378 0.06110
D5 0.213634 0.177593 1.202942 0.2292 D5 0.24364 0.09532 2.55600 0.01070 D5 0.26174 0.15536 1.68475 0.09220
D6 0.147494 0.178086 0.82822 0.4077 D6 0.17349 0.09280 1.86961 0.06170 D6 0.17197 0.15148 1.13525 0.25640
D7 0.124424 0.178486 0.697109 0.4858 D7 0.14866 0.09186 1.61830 0.10580 D7 0.15261 0.15053 1.01385 0.31080
D8 0.134301 0.180149 0.745501 0.4561 D8 0.11083 0.09297 1.19207 0.23340 D8 0.13289 0.15356 0.86537 0.38700
D9 0.165522 0.181405 0.912447 0.3617 D9 0.12094 0.09427 1.28285 0.19980 D9 0.16547 0.15793 1.04776 0.29490
D10 0.203217 0.181385 1.120365 0.2627 D10 0.13944 0.09464 1.47341 0.14090 D10 0.17824 0.16034 1.11161 0.26650
D11 0.22893 0.181311 1.262642 0.2069 D11 0.15562 0.09572 1.62567 0.10420 D11 0.21849 0.16259 1.34385 0.17920
D12 0.239162 0.180873 1.322263 0.1863 D12 0.14236 0.09705 1.46677 0.14270 D12 0.22199 0.16608 1.33660 0.18150
AC 0.080565 0.026712 3.016052 0.0026 AC 0.03932 0.02216 1.77467 0.07620 AC 0.07627 0.04525 1.68542 0.09210
BIG4 0.323884 0.02874 11.2696 0 BIG4 0.18959 0.02199 8.62044 0.00000 BIG4 0.20874 0.06574 3.17522 0.00150
LCAR 0.170516 0.061721 2.762685 0.0058 LCAR 0.20371 0.06856 2.97121 0.00300 LCAR 0.11967 0.11493 1.04121 0.29790
LNI -0.006 0.002785 -2.153103 0.0315 LNI -0.00247 0.00103 -2.39204 0.01690 LNI -0.00428 0.00267 -1.60077 0.10960
LNPLR 0.038477 0.009602 4.007282 0.0001 LNPLR 0.04464 0.01432 3.11689 0.00190 LNPLR 0.06064 0.01805 3.35943 0.00080
LOSS -0.12711 0.115762 -1.098045 0.2724 LOSS -0.09675 0.04334 -2.23216 0.02580 LOSS -0.11160 0.09652 -1.15627 0.24770
LSUBS 0.047087 0.010256 4.591045 0 LSUBS 0.03568 0.01886 1.89209 0.05870 LSUBS -0.02039 0.03518 -0.57943 0.56240
LTA 0.632052 0.017454 36.21236 0 LTA 0.83686 0.06008 13.92964 0.00000 LTA 0.73408 0.06088 12.05767 0.00000
PD 0.001997 0.005801 0.344306 0.7307 PD 0.02243 0.00840 2.67005 0.00770 PD 0.00808 0.01323 0.61061 0.54150
C -0.71586 0.392514 -1.823783 0.0684 C -5.18141 1.27212 -4.07306 0.00000 C -2.80533 1.13677 -2.46780 0.01370
R-squared 0.937131 17.22067 S.D.  Rho  
Adjusted R-squared 0.936328 7.101534 0.296049 0.5712
S.E. of regression 0.39778 247.6284 0.256493 0.4288
F-statistic 1166.411 2.450852 R-squared 0.937131 17.05741
Prob(F-statistic) 0 Adjusted R-squared 0.936328 7.074476
S.E. of regression 0.253090 92.49489 R-squared 0.71982 3.10097
F-statistic 534.8385 2.190852 Adjusted R-squared 0.716239 0.48602
R-squared 0.904071 13.27235 Prob(F-statistic) 0 S.E. of regression 0.258898 104.8992
Sum squared resid 254.0151 0.444517 F-statistic 201.0343 1.02603
Prob(F-statistic) 0
R-squared 0.963512 13.27235
Sum squared resid 96.61861 1.060841
R-squared 0.898299 13.27235
Sum squared resid 269.2999 0.399664
Date: 09/16/16   Time: 02:20
Sample: 2003 2015
Periods included: 13
    Mean dependent var
    Durbin-Watson stat
Unweighted Statistics
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Durbin-Watson stat
Cross-sections included: 122
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1586
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Weighted Statistics
Dependent Variable: LAF
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Cross-sections included: 122
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1586
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Dependent Variable: LAF
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 09/16/16   Time: 02:25
Sample: 2003 2015
Periods included: 13
Cross-sections included: 122
Total panel (balanced) observations: 1586
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Dependent Variable: LAF
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Date: 09/16/16   Time: 02:22
Sample: 2003 2015
Periods included: 13
    Mean dependent var
    Durbin-Watson stat
Effects Specification
Cross-section random
Idiosyncratic random
Weighted Statistics
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Durbin-Watson stat
Effects Specification
Weighted Statistics
Unweighted Statistics
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Sum squared resid
    Durbin-Watson stat
    Mean dependent var
    Durbin-Watson stat
Unweighted Statistics
  
X 
Table 18: Pre-crisis & Post-crisis | Redundant Fixed Effect Test results 
 
 
Table 19: Total Sample | Hausman Random Effects Test & Redundant Fixed Effect Test 
 
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 28.87951 -121,475 0
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 88.86486 -121,838 0
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section fixed effects
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section fixed effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 18.3429 20 0.03595
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 138.9462 1,215 0.00000
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section random effects
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: Untitled
Test cross-section fixed effects
